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How much does a nation's religious environment affect the religious beliefs of its citizens? Do religious nations differ from secular nations in how beliefs are passed on from generation to generation? To find out, we use data from the 1991 International Social Survey Programme collected in 15 nations from 19,815 respondents. We use diagonal reference models estimated by nonlinear regression to control for a nation's level of economic development and exposure to Communism, and for the individual's denomination, age, gender, and education. We find that (1) people living in religious nations will, in proportion to the religiosity of their fellow-citizens, acquire more orthodox beliefs than otherwise similar people living in secular nations; (2) in relatively secular nations, family religiosity strongly shapes children's religious beliefs, while the influence of national religious context is small; (3) in relatively religious nations family religiosity, although important, has less effect on children's beliefs than does national context. These three patterns hold in rich nations and in poor nations, in formerly Communist nations and in established democracies, and among old and young, men and women, the well-educated and the poorly educated, and for Catholics and Protestants. Findings on the link between belief and church attendance are inconsistent with the influential "supply-side" analysis of differences between nations.

Religion remains a central element of modern life, shaping people's world-views, moral standards, family lives, and in many nations, their politics. But in many Western nations, modernization and secularization may be eroding Christian beliefs, with profound consequences that have intrigued sociologists since Durkheim. Yet this much touted secularization may be overstated—certainly it varies widely among nations and is absent in the United States

(Benson, Donahue, and Erickson 1989:154–57; Felling, Peters, and Schreuder 1991; Firebaugh and Harley 1991; Stark and Iannaccone 1994). We explore the degree to which religious beliefs are passed on from generation to generation in different nations. Devout parents socialize their children, inculcating religious beliefs in most of them. But inevitably some offspring break with their parents' beliefs—especially between ages 10 and 30 when children come in contact with the wider world, with teachers and peer groups, when they mature and take jobs, acquire new friends, and eventually marry

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and form their own families (Need and De Graaf 1996). If there were no influences other than the family to inculcate belief, even a small loss in each generation would eventually produce a secular society.

We propose that one source of the durability of religious belief is the religious context of the nation as a whole: In proportion to the orthodoxy of their fellow citizens, people born into religious nations will acquire more orthodox beliefs than otherwise similar people born into secular nations. Following the literatures on religious socialization, secularization, and geographic differences in religious beliefs, we argue that this contextual effect comes about in part through people's exposure to religious culture (and perhaps to pro-religious government policies), and in part because the pools of potential friends, teachers, colleagues, and marriage partners are predominantly devout. Conversely, in secular societies, individuals are likely to acquire secular friends, teachers, colleagues, and marriage partners and so become secular themselves. We test this argument, which has not previously been rigorously tested.¹ Moreover, we go beyond these traditional claims, arguing that these processes interact with the family's religious background in ways that make family background more important in secular nations, but make national context more important in religious nations.

THEORY

Devout parents inculcate religious beliefs in their children directly by explicit teaching and by example, and indirectly by shaping their children's views of life (Benson et al.

¹ An important cross-national literature assesses church attendance, mainly using aggregate data. In a review, Stark and Iannaccone (1994: 239–41) argue that church attendance reflects the interplay of "potential demand" for religious services (general beliefs in the supernatural that provide a motive for attending religious services) and the "supply" of religious services offered in each nation, with the "supply-side" characteristics of nations strongly influencing church attendance. Our argument and data speak to the potential demand for services, and thus complement their approach. Unlike Stark and Iannaccone's analysis, however, ours relies on individual-level data rather than aggregate-level data.

1989:162–66; Francis and Brown 1991; Hoge and Petrillo 1978; Myers 1996). This process is not unique to religion—parents also inculcate moral values, political preferences, and a wide variety of other attitudes, values, and preferences (Acock and Bengtson 1978; Jennings, Allerbeck, and Rosenmayr 1979; Jennings and Markus 1984).

But parents are not the only force affecting religious beliefs. Children acquire diverse friends outside the family, forming peer groups that by adolescence exert a strong independent influence on their religious beliefs (Hoge and Petrillo 1978; Spika, Hood, and Gorsuch 1985). Children also come into contact with schools and teachers who may shape their values (Benson et al. 1989:166–67; Greeley and Gockel 1971). Children are exposed to religious values (or their absence) in school curricula, the mass media, and the nation's culture. Some are exposed to government sponsored propaganda that can shape their views—either pro-religious (as in Ireland and many Islamic nations) or antireligious (as in Eastern Europe in Communist times) (Stark and Iannaccone 1994:236–39). In time, children leave home, reducing their parents' impact on their beliefs, behavior, and values (Need and De Graaf 1996). They acquire new friends, new colleagues at work, and new peer groups, all of which may shape their religious views (Wuthnow 1994). Eventually, they marry, founding new families that become central influences on their lives, strongly shaping (and being shaped by) their religious and other values (Hoge and Petrillo 1978; Need and De Graaf 1996). Religious beliefs thus depend not only on parents' religious beliefs, but also on the religious content of school curricula and the mass media, on the religious policies of the government and churches, on the general religious content of the nation's culture and dominant values, and especially on the religious "environment" that people live in—their friends, peer groups, schools, teachers, and marriage partners.

To some extent, people shape their religious environments by choosing religiously compatible friends, colleagues, and marriage partners. They may even convert their friends and (especially) their marriage partners to their own religious beliefs. Thus to some extent, religious environment is a consequence

of prior religious convictions, and not an influence on them.

But a person's religious environment is also shaped by factors other than their own and their parents' religious beliefs, and hence is a potential cause of those beliefs, not a consequence of them. Friends and spouses are chosen on the basis of propinquity, personality, interests, education, occupation, political views, sheer chance, and many other traits besides religion. Schools are chosen on the basis of quality, cost, or location, not just religious compatibility. Jobs and employers are chosen more on the basis of opportunity, pay, interest, and propinquity rather than for religious reasons.

We argue that prominent among these "unchosen" aspects of one's religious environment is birthplace. People have no control over where they are born. Hence they have no choice about whether they grow up in a predominantly religious or predominantly secular culture, and no choice about whether they are exposed to pro- or antireligious policies and propaganda by church and state. If they are born into a predominantly devout nation, the pool of potential friends, teachers, colleagues, and marriage partners will differ from the pool available in a predominantly secular nation. As a consequence, and other things being equal, people born into a religious nation are likely to acquire religious friends, teachers, colleagues, and marriage partners and therefore are likely to become (or remain) religious. Conversely, people born into secular nations are likely to acquire secular friends, teachers, colleagues, and spouses, and therefore are likely to become secular themselves. The same logic applies to people born during particularly religious or irreligious periods of a nation's history, or in particularly religious or irreligious geographic regions. Hence:

Hypothesis 1: People born into religious nations will, in proportion to the orthodoxy of their fellow-citizens, acquire more orthodox beliefs than otherwise similar people born into secular nations.

This type of contextual hypothesis, using the dependent variable to define the context, has a long history in sociology and political science (e.g., Blalock 1984:353-59; Przeworski 1974). In our case, the dependent

variable is the individual's religious belief, and nations are classified according to the average intensity of their citizens' religious beliefs. At first glance, such reasoning may seem circular, but such relationships are far from tautological (Blalock 1984:363-69; Boyd and Iversen 1979:22-59). For instance, the familiar and seemingly obvious ecological hypothesis that local political context influences voting behavior (Butler and Stokes 1974:130-37) turns out on closer analysis to be false (Kelley and McAllister 1985).

Further, we argue that national religious context has different effects on the strategies of devout and secular families. In a predominantly secular society, children are likely to acquire secular friends, teachers, work colleagues, and marriage partners. This poses a serious problem for devout parents and their churches: To ensure that their children acquire and retain orthodox religious beliefs, they need to control the children's social environments and restrict their choices of friends to those with compatible religious beliefs. They do this by screening potential friends, teachers, and marriage partners; by enrolling their children in church groups or sending them to religious schools to ensure an appropriate pool of potential friends and marriage partners; by socializing their children to reject the irreligious; and in many other ways (Benson et al. 1989:164-67; Stark and McCann 1993). Insofar as parents succeed in controlling their children's social environments, they effectively shut out most of the irreligious national environment's secularizing pressures. Hence, the effect of the family's religious background will be large and the effect of national environment will be small.

Conversely, in a predominantly religious society, devout parents need not worry about the possibility of their children acquiring secular beliefs from friends, teachers, colleagues, or spouses, because almost everyone is devout. Therefore, devout parents need not invest time, effort, or money in controlling their children's social environments; they need not endure the emotional strain and potential conflict this imposes on parent-child relations; and they need not accept the potential loss of desirable friends and marriage partners that such restrictions would impose on their children.

Irreligious parents face the opposite constraints. In a secular society, they need not worry about their children getting into a devout social environment, because most potential friends, colleagues, and marriage partners are secular. In a religious society, however, their children are at risk of being drawn into a devout social environment. Thus, if the prospect of their children acquiring religious beliefs is distasteful, parents have a strong incentive to control their children's environment.

We suggest, however, that most secular parents will not strongly object to their children accepting some religious tenets. Few secular parents are committed atheists—most are agnostic or believe in some vague higher power if not in a personal, anthropocentric god (Greeley 1992:66–68). Even if they are convinced there is no God, parents may see little harm in their children becoming religious—the duties imposed by religion are rarely onerous, the emotional support and sense of meaning and purpose religion provides are valuable (Poloma and Pendelton 1990), and there is usually no “antichurch” institution encouraging secularism (save those countries under Communist rule). Moreover, being secular in a devout nation can have practical disadvantages because of prejudice on the part of the religious, and the restrictions that prejudice can impose on choices of friends, schools, jobs, and marriage partners. Hence, we suggest, most secular parents will make little effort to insulate their children from the religious pressures of a devout society. Nor will secular parents prevent their children from acquiring devout friends, colleagues, and marriage partners. As a consequence, many children of secular parents will become religious. Thus:

Hypothesis 2a: In relatively secular societies, devout families usually insulate their children from secular pressures, hence family background strongly shapes religious beliefs while national influences are small.

Hypothesis 2b: In relatively devout societies, secular families do not usually insulate their children from religious pressures, hence family background has little effect on religious beliefs and national influences are large.

DATA

Data are from the 1991 “Religion” module of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), an international consortium composed primarily of academic survey organizations (Zentralarchiv 1993). Each year, the ISSP creates a module containing exactly the same questions, answer categories, and sequencing for all countries surveyed. This module is then fielded in conjunction with each country's regular annual survey. Each country also collects detailed data on background and demographic variables, using questions appropriate to local circumstances and institutions.

The samples are all large, representative national samples of adults. The most common procedure is to hold face-to-face interviews with a stratified random sample (occasionally a panel on an earlier sample), followed by a leave-behind self-completion questionnaire containing the ISSP module (Zentralarchiv 1993). Some surveys are conducted entirely by interview, and a few are entirely self-completion. Completion rates average over 60 percent (counting losses both at the interview and the self-completion stages). These rates compare favorably with recent experiences in many industrial nations. For example, the completion rates for the highly regarded 1989 “International Crime Victimization Survey” averaged 41 percent over 14 nations (Van Dijk, Mayhew, and Killias 1990). ISSP data appear accurately to reflect opinion in each nation and have been widely used in international comparisons (e.g., Kelley and Evans 1993, 1995). Data were processed by the Zentralarchiv (Scheuch and Uher 1993).

In all there are 19,815 cases: 2,203 in Australia (Kelley, Evans, and Bean 1993); 984 in Austria (Haller and Hoellinger 1993); 1,486 in East Germany (Mohler and Braun 1992); 1,257 in Great Britain (Jowell et al. 1992); 1,000 in Hungary (Kolosi 1992); 1,005 in Ireland (Ward and Whelan 1992); 983 in Italy (Calvi 1992); 1,635 in the Netherlands (Social and Cultural Planning Office 1992); 1,070 in New Zealand (Gendall 1992); 838 in Northern Ireland (Jowell et al. 1992); 1,506 in Norway (Norwegian Social Science Data Services 1992); 1,063 in Poland (Cichomski 1992); 2,080 in Slovenia (Tos

Table 1. Percentage Distribution of Responses to Questions about Religious Beliefs: Pooled Data for 15 Nations, 1991

Questionnaire Item	Scoring Percent (in Points)	
Please indicate which statement below comes closest to expressing what you believe about God. (Degree of Belief)		
I don't believe in God	12	0
I don't know whether there is a God and I don't believe there is any way to find out ...	10	20
I don't believe in a personal God, but I do believe in a higher power of some kind	15	40
I find myself believing in God some of the time, but not at others	9	60
While I have doubts, I feel that I do believe in God	20	80
I know God really exists and I have no doubts about it	34	100
Number of cases		19,528
Mean		63
Loading on factor 1 ^a		.92
Which best describes your beliefs about God? (Belief Timing)		
I don't believe in God now and I never have	16	0
I don't believe in God now, but I used to	14	33
I believe in God now, but I didn't use to	6	67
I believe in God now and I always have	64	100
Number of cases		17,002
Mean		72
Loading on factor 1 ^a		.89
How close to you feel to God most of the time? (Feel Close)		
Don't believe in God	16	0
Not close at all	11	25
Not very close	21	50
Somewhat close	38	75
Extremely close	16	100
Number of cases		17,710
Mean		57
Loading on factor 1 ^a		.92
There is a God who concerns Himself with every human being, personally. (God Cares)		
Strongly agree	19	100
Agree	24	75
Neither agree nor disagree	18	50
Disagree	19	25
Strongly disagree	19	0
Number of cases		17,614
Mean		51
Loading on factor 1 ^a		.81

^a Factor loadings are from a principal axis factor analysis with communalities estimated iteratively. Country-specific factor analytic results and correlations are available from the authors at www.international-survey.org.

and Stebe 1992); 1,346 in West Germany (Mohler and Braun 1992); and 1,359 in the United States (Davis and Smith 1991). In total, there are 17,635 cases with complete data on all variables in our model.²

MEASUREMENT

Religious Belief

Our religious belief scale, which conceptually and empirically resembles standard religious orthodoxy scales used in previous research (Felling et al. 1991; Van der Slik 1994), measures belief in a supernatural being who is concerned with each individual human (Table 1). Most of the items have been used previously in the NORC General Social Survey in the United States, the SOCON survey in the Netherlands, or the World Values Survey in many nations.

In our pooled sample, 12 percent do not believe in God, 10 percent are agnostic, 15 percent believe not in a personal God but in a higher power of some kind, 9 percent believe in God some of the time but not at other times, 20 percent believe but have some doubts, and 34 percent believe in God and have no doubts (Table 1, item 1). Only 1 percent did not answer. We score these answers conventionally in equal intervals, from a low of 0 ("do not believe in God") to a high of 100 ("believe and have no doubts"). This scoring gives a clear and convenient metric (Evans, Kelley, and Kolosi 1992:468–69), but any other equal-interval scoring would lead to mathematically identical standardized results and metric results differing only by a linear transformation. Using our scoring, belief in God averages 63 points out of 100, with a standard deviation of 36.

Using this 0 to 100 scoring, answers to a question which focuses on stability of belief over time average 72 points (question 2), feelings of personal closeness to God average 57 (question 3), and degrees of belief in a God who concerns himself with every person (question 4) average 51.

These four items are highly correlated in all 15 nations, suggesting that they all measure a single underlying factor (Table 2). In the pooled sample, inter-item correlations average .79 with a scale reliability (alpha) of .93; reliabilities are between .79 and .95 in each nation separately. Factor loadings average .88 in the pooled analysis, with equally high figures in separate analyses for each country. The four items also have very similar correlations with other variables in the model both in the pooled sample and within each nation (results available from the authors).

Our religious orthodoxy scale is the average of answers to the four questions in Table 1. Respondents who answered some but not all questions are assigned the average of the questions they did answer. Those who failed to answer any of the questions (1 percent) are omitted from the analysis.

Parents' Church Attendance

We measure the religious orientation of the family in which each respondent was raised by their mother's and father's church attendance when the respondent was 14 or 15 years old. Previous research indicates that church attendance—a clear-cut behavior—is reliably reported and is generally the key family influence, with strong direct and indirect effects on respondent's religion (Benson et al. 1989:163–66; Hoge and Petrillo 1978).

Because we are interested in the overall effect of the family, we average mother's and father's church attendance. If data were available for only one parent, we used that. Only 7 percent failed to answer for at least one parent.³ Mother's and father's church attendance are highly correlated ($r = .77$ in the pooled sample), and have similar correlations with other variables (results available on request). Averaging them gives a reliable measure (alpha = .93 in the pooled sample); separating them would unnecessarily complicate the analysis and would be difficult because of their high correlation. Previous research on their relative importance is inconclusive (Benson et al. 1989:165–66; Acock

² We do not use the Israeli dataset, the Russian dataset (which omits some key variables), or the Philippines dataset (which has a serious processing error).

³ An analysis excluding cases with missing data on either parent's church attendance leads to the same conclusions as our preferred model.

Table 2. Belief in a Personal God: Inter-Item Correlations, 15 Nations 1991

Nation	Degree of Belief ^a			Belief Timing ^b		Feel Close ^c
	Belief Timing ^b	Feel Close ^c	God Cares ^d	Feel Close ^c	God Cares ^d	God Cares ^d
All	.83	.84	.76	.83	.71	.76
Australia	.84	.84	.81	.80	.71	.79
Austria	.62	.67	.57	.71	.57	.64
East Germany	.84	.87	.74	.87	.75	.77
Great Britain	.83	.84	.78	.81	.72	.80
Hungary	.81	.81	.65	.84	.62	.66
Ireland	.63	.55	.46	.50	.41	.59
Italy	.74	.72	.61	.71	.50	.58
Netherlands	.84	.87	.81	.88	.75	.78
New Zealand	.82	.83	.79	.80	.71	.78
Northern Ireland	.68	.63	.58	.58	.54	.60
Norway	.84	.88	.84	.85	.76	.83
Poland	.62	.56	.44	.54	.41	.48
Slovenia	.83	.88	.69	.87	.66	.70
United States	.55	.58	.56	.61	.48	.63
West Germany	.63	.76	.65	.74	.61	.68

Note: Complete question wording for all variables is in Table 1. Reliability (alpha) is .93 in the pooled sample and ranges from .83 to .95 for each nation separately.

^a Degree of belief in God, from “I don’t believe in God” to “I know God really exists and I have no doubts about it.”

^b Belief timing from “I don’t believe in God and never have” to “I believe in God now and always have.”

^c “How close do you feel to God most of the time?”

^d “There is a God who concerns Himself with every human being, personally.”

and Bengtson 1978), so there should be little loss in ignoring these differences.

We group parents’ church attendance into five groups (scored 1 to 5 in the analysis):

Secular (1) Parents never attend church, or have no religion;

(2) Parents attend about once a year;

(3) Parents attend several times a year up to once a month;

(4) Parents attend several times a month up to almost every week; and

Devout (5) Parents attend every week or more often.

One complication is that church attendance might have different meanings in different nations. Regular church attendance could indicate that parents are unusually devout in nations in which church attendance is atypi-

cal or politically unpopular (as in the former East Germany during the Communist era), or where “monopolistic” churches make little effort to provide attractive and diverse services (Stark and Iannaccone 1994). If so, this could introduce some error in our analysis, which assumes that the meaning of parents’ church attendance is comparable in all 15 nations. Lacking data on parents’ beliefs, we can not test for this possibility directly. But we can test it indirectly by looking at the relation between respondent’s church attendance and the intensity of respondent’s religious belief, on the reasonable assumption that this reflects the usual pattern for the respondent’s nation (Table 3).

Regular church attenders have much the same religious beliefs in all the nations for which we have data (Table 3). Those who attend weekly average 89 points (out of 100) in religious belief, and this figure varies only

Table 3. Respondent's Mean Religiosity Score by Respondent's Church Attendance: 13 Nations, 1991

Country	Frequency of Church Attendance					Number of Cases
	Weekly	Almost Weekly	Monthly	A Few Times a Year	Never	
Total	89	83	78	61	34	16,466
Australia	92	86	78	61	38	2,147
East Germany	87	78	— ^a	42	12	1,475
Great Britain	88	82	77	65	45	1,203
Hungary	89	84	76	56	28	984
Ireland	87	80	76	67	49	1,003
Italy	88	80	78	67	38	981
Netherlands	88	77	71	58	33	1,620
New Zealand	91	82	78	58	41	1,045
Northern Ireland	91	84	81	74	65	820
Norway	96	95	85	61	32	1,462
Poland	89	85	78	63	33	1,057
United States	93	89	82	76	63	1,327
West Germany	85	79	— ^a	58	34	1,342

Note: Respondent's church attendance was not asked in Austria or Slovenia.

^a Category not available in survey

slightly from a low of 85 in West Germany to a high of 96 in Norway. Those who attend church almost every week are a little less devout on average, those who attend monthly are a little less devout again, and those who attend only a few times a year are noticeably less devout; but for all groups the pattern is similar in all 13 nations. The largest variation occurs among those who never attend church: Their religious beliefs average 34 points, indicating that for the most part they do not believe in a God who is personally concerned with each human being but they are uncertain about the matter, or they believe in some kind of higher power. However East Germans who never attend are noticeably less devout than the average, scoring only 12 points, while Americans (63 points) and the Northern Irish (65 points) are noticeably more devout. Thus, there is some uncertainty about parents who never attend church.

To test whether these difficulties affect our results, we excluded the deviant cases from the analysis (East German, American, and Northern Irish respondents raised by parents who never went to church) and reestimated our preferred model. The results are virtually

unchanged (results available from the authors), and we conclude that these uncertainties are not consequential for our analysis.

Note that these findings are not consistent with the influential "supply-side" argument—that nations with religious monopolies have large unmet religious needs, while churches in religiously competitive nations like the United States more successfully meet the population's diverse religious needs. This argument implies that those who do not attend church are more devout in monopolistic societies. But our findings show exactly the opposite: People who don't attend church are actually more devout in religiously competitive societies like the United States and Northern Ireland.

Secular and Religious Nations

Measuring how secular or religious a respondent's national environment was when he or she was growing up, requires a measure of the religiosity of other people in the nation—the people among whom the respondents would find their friends, teachers, and spouses. We measure national religiosity by

an unweighted average of parental church attendance in the nation as a whole and religious belief in the nation as a whole. Characterizing contexts by the average level of the dependent variable, or some similar variable, is usual and appropriate (Blalock 1984: 363–68; Boyd and Iversen 1979:22–59). It would not be wise to characterize each nation separately using dummy variables (Blalock 1984:357; Farkas 1974). We divided the nations into five groups ranging from most secular to most religious (scored 1 to 5 in the analysis):

- Secular* (1) East Germany and Norway;
 (2) Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, Hungary, Slovenia, the Netherlands;
 (3) West Germany and Austria;
 (4) United States and Italy;⁴ and
Religious (5) Northern Ireland, Poland, and Ireland.

Other plausible measures give much the same ranking of nations and lead to virtually identical results (results available from the authors).

Other Contextual Characteristics of Nations

Modernization theory suggests that religious belief will decline as nations become more prosperous, educated, and modern (e.g., Becker and Vink 1994; Peters 1993). To take these factors into account, we measure a nation's level of development by its gross national product per capita in 1987, at parity purchasing power (World Bank 1996). For clarity, we express these figures as percentages of the U.S. GNP, ranging from a low of 21 (Poland) to a high of 100 (United States).

For some 40 years preceding our surveys, many Communist nations followed explicit antireligious policies. We take this into account by including a dummy variable coded

⁴ Although the United States and Italy have very different religious institutions ("supply")—an established monopolistic church in Italy, but religious diversity in the United States—the key issue for our analysis is the *level of belief* in the general public ("demand"), and that is similar in the two countries.

1 for formerly Communist nations and 0 otherwise.

A large literature argues for "American exceptionalism" in religion. In theory, America's competitive, entrepreneurial, open "religious market" contrasts so sharply with the typical European situation—in which there is an established church with a religious monopoly—that two different paradigms seem appropriate (Warner 1993). Empirically, the traditional paradigm (Berger 1969) based on European experience sees the high levels of religiosity in the United States as atypical of modern industrial societies. We therefore include a dummy variable coded 1 for the United States and 0 otherwise.

Individual Characteristics

Because Catholics and Protestants differ in a variety of ways (Peters and Schreuder 1987; Weber [1921] 1972), we include two dummy variables for parents' denomination: one for Catholics and one for non-Christians. The reference category is Protestant (together with a few atheists and nondenominational Christians). We also test for interactions involving Catholicism, family background, and national context because Catholics differ from Protestants in the balance of the individual and institutional orientations in their religions (Weber [1921] 1972).

Because religious belief typically increases with age (Benson et al. 1989:157–59), and nations differ in their age structures, we include respondent's age (in years).

Men typically are less devout than women (Benson et al. 1989:159–60), and nations differ somewhat in their sex composition—so we include sex (coded 1 for men and 0 for women).

Well-educated individuals are generally less devout than are the poorly educated (Benson et al. 1989:166–67), and education is correlated both with parents' church attendance and GNP. We therefore include education measured in years of schooling following ISSP definitions (Zentralarchiv 1993).

METHODS AND MODELS

In its simplest form, the relation between parents' churchgoing and the strength of respondent's religious belief in different na-

NATIONAL RELIGIOSITY	PARENTS' CHURCH ATTENDANCE				
	Secular (1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	Devout (5)
Religious (5)	$w a_5 + (1-w) a_1$	$w a_5 + (1-w) a_2$	$w a_5 + (1-w) a_3$	$w a_5 + (1-w) a_4$	a_5
(4)	$w a_4 + (1-w) a_1$	$w a_4 + (1-w) a_2$	$w a_4 + (1-w) a_3$	a_4	$w a_4 + (1-w) a_5$
(3)	$w a_3 + (1-w) a_1$	$w a_3 + (1-w) a_2$	a_3	$w a_3 + (1-w) a_4$	$w a_3 + (1-w) a_5$
(2)	$w a_2 + (1-w) a_1$	a_2	$w a_2 + (1-w) a_3$	$w a_2 + (1-w) a_4$	$w a_2 + (1-w) a_5$
Secular (1)	a_1	$w a_1 + (1-w) a_2$	$w a_1 + (1-w) a_3$	$w a_1 + (1-w) a_4$	$w a_1 + (1-w) a_5$

Figure 1. Design of the Diagonal Reference Model: Combinations of Parents' Church Attendance and National Religiosity

Note: Shaded cells represent the average religiosity of each consistent ideal-typical cell. The order of the rows is reversed (5 to 1 rather than the usual 1 to 5) to correspond with Figures 2 through 4.

tions can be represented in a three-dimensional table, with nations in the rows (ranked from secular to religious), family background in the columns (ranked from secular to devout), and each cell displaying the average religious belief score of respondents living in that religious a nation and coming from that devout a family (for the moment we ignore control variables like age and GNP). For clarity, we make the table square, with five categories of national religiosity and five categories of parents' church attendance. The ideal-typical religious settings are on the main diagonal: The religious extreme is represented by people living in devout nations and coming from devout families; the secular extreme is represented by people living in secular nations and coming from secular families. Between these extremes are other ideal-typical settings—people living in nations of intermediate levels of religiosity and coming from families with intermediate levels of devoutness. In these diagonal cells, the religiosity of the nation is congruent with the devoutness of the family. We model the religiosity of cells with an inconsistent context—cells in which the devoutness of the nation is not consistent with the devoutness of the family—as a function of cells with consistent contexts.

Diagonal reference models (Hendrickx et al. 1993; Sobel 1981) are designed to model

situations of this sort in a clear and parsimonious manner. These models have been applied to a variety of similar inconsistency and mobility problems, such as social mobility and fertility (Sobel 1985), educational mobility and apostasy (Van der Slik, De Graaf, and Peters 1995), social mobility and politics (De Graaf, Nieuwebeerta, and Heath 1995; De Graaf and Ultee 1990), and the effects of heterogamy (De Graaf and Heath 1992; Van Berkel and De Graaf 1995). Although diagonal reference models originally were designed to model the impact of individual variables, they can be used to model the impact of macro variables like national context, giving unbiased point estimates of contextual effects of national characteristics.⁵

The design can be visualized as shown in Figure 1, where w is the weight for the national devoutness and $1-w$ is the weight for

⁵ The disadvantage is that the standard errors will be slightly low. Multi-level methods (Goldstein 1987) would allow us to estimate similar but much less parsimonious linear models while giving asymptotically correct standard errors. The diagonal reference model applied to this problem produces a single standard error that applies to both the individual's family background and the macro context of the nation, and the two levels cannot be separated statistically. We believe that the conceptual advantages and statistical parsimony of the diagonal reference models outweigh this small statistical disadvantage.

parents' church attendance: Here a_1 to a_5 (the shaded cells) represent the average religiosity of each consistent ideal-typical cell. The implication for the religiosity of a person in an inconsistent cell, for example someone in a religious nation who has secular parents (upper left-hand corner), is a weighted average of the religiosity of two consistent cells—those living in a religious nation and having devout parents (a_5), and those living in a secular nation and having secular parents (a_1).

Formally, the diagonal reference model can be written:

$$Y_{ijk} = wa_i + (1-w)a_j + E_{ijk};$$

where $i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5; j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5;$

$k = 1, \dots, N;$

and $0 \leq w \leq 1.$ (1)

In equation 1, Y_{ijk} represents the dependent variable, the intensity of religious belief of respondent k ; i represents the religiosity of the nation; and j represents parents' church attendance. There is one parameter a for each diagonal cell, which represents the expected mean degree of religious belief of respondents within consistent combinations of parental church attendance and national religiosity. Parameters w and $(1-w)$ are weights that indicate the relative importance of parental church attendance and national religious context respectively on respondent's religious beliefs. E_{ijk} is a stochastic error term with an expected value of 0. One advantage of the model is that it makes no assumption about the linearity of the association.

A diagonal reference model with covariates in addition to the main variables can be written as:

$$Y_{ijk} = wa_i + (1-w)a_j + \sum \beta_m X_{ijkm} + E_{ijk}. \quad (2)$$

For each covariate X_m we estimate a beta parameter β_m . There are, therefore, m covariates and m beta parameters. This equation describes Model A (with covariates for age, gender, education, Catholic, non-Christian, previous Communist society, GNP, and a dummy for the United States), which explains 35 percent of the variance. Table 4 presents the goodness-of-fit statistics for Model A and the other models.

Model B relaxes the restriction that the weight parameters be the same for each

level of national religiosity and gives a more flexible model:

$$w = p + d_1(\text{row}_2) + d_2(\text{row}_3) + d_3(\text{row}_4) + d_5(\text{row}_5). \quad (3)$$

Substituting equation 3 into equation 2 gives the equation for Model B with five weight coefficients, one for each religiosity level: p is the reference parameter for a secular nation (row 1); $p + d_1$ is the weight for row 2; $p + d_2$ is the weight for row 3; and so forth. Weights for parental church attendance, $1-w$, decline conversely. This model, which explains 36 percent of the variance, leads to a substantial improvement in fit compared to baseline Model A ($\chi^2 = 193.3$, d.f. = 4). The BIC criterion (Raftery 1986) also suggests an improvement in fit.

Finally, because the weight coefficients for rows 2 and 3, and for rows 4 and 5 are almost equal, we put an extra restriction on the weights to create Model C:

$$w = p + d_1(\text{row}_{2,3}) + d_2(\text{row}_{4,5}). \quad (4)$$

In Model C, the nation weight is p for people living in a secular nation (row 1). The weight increases by d_1 for people living in a nation of intermediate religiosity (rows 2 and 3), while the parental weight $(1-w)$ decreases by d_1 . The same logic holds for d_2 for religious nations (rows 4 and 5). Model C fits almost as well as Model B, but it is more parsimonious. The BIC criterion also suggests that it is preferable to Model B.

Alternative Models

The relative weights of national religiosity and of parental church attendance may also vary between Catholics and Protestants (Weber [1921] 1972), between old and young, between men and women, between the well-educated and the poorly educated, between formerly Communist nations and other nations, or between rich nations and poor nations. To test these possibilities, in Model D we allow a dichotomous variable (e.g., Catholic background) to interact with the weight parameters:

$$w = p + d_1(\text{row}_{2,3}) + d_2(\text{row}_{4,5}) + d_3(\text{parent Catholic}). \quad (5)$$

Table 4. Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Diagonal Reference Models Predicting Respondent's Religiosity: 15 Nations, 1991

Model	Description	Degrees of Freedom	Difference in Chi-Square from Model A	Difference in BIC from Model A
A	Baseline diagonal reference model with covariates (Equation 2)	14	—	—
B	Model A + separate weights for each level of national religiosity (Equation 3)	18	193.3 (4)	-154.2
C ^a	Model A + separate weights for intermediate nations (rows 2 and 3) and devout nations (rows 4 and 5) (Equation 4)	16	193.8 (2)	-174.3
D	Model C + separate weight for those with Catholic parents (Equation 5)	17	196.6 (3)	-167.3
	Model C + separate weight for age	17	192.8 (3)	-163.5
	Model C + separate weight for males	17	194.0 (3)	-164.7
	Model C + separate weight for education	17	196.3 (3)	-167.0
	Model C + separate weight for formerly Communist societies	17	194.5 (3)	-165.2
	Model C + separate weight for GNP	17	205.1 (3)	-175.8

Note: Numbers in parentheses are degrees of freedom for the chi-square calculation. Number of cases is 17,635. Model C explains 36 percent of the variance. For Model A, BIC = -7572.1.

^a Model C is the preferred model.

For each of our main independent variables in turn, we substitute equation 5 into equation 2.

Some of these interactions show small but statistically significant improvements in fit. The BIC criterion, however, suggests that only one of the improvements might justify the increased complexity of these models. We therefore prefer the more parsimonious Model C.⁶

RESULTS

Description

Table 5 and Figure 2 describe the joint effect of the nation's religious environment and par-

⁶ The version of Model D that includes a separate weight for GNP has a slightly lower BIC. However with only 15 nations there is necessarily some uncertainty, especially as GNP is highly correlated with the dummy variables for the United States ($r = .52$) and communism ($r = -.79$), and its effects vary depending on whether or not the United States is included in the analysis.

ents' church attendance on respondent's religious belief, without adjusting for other individual or contextual variables. (1) Clearly, parental religiosity matters greatly: People with devout parents are far more likely to acquire orthodox beliefs than are those with secular parents. (2) People born into religious societies are much more likely to hold orthodox religious beliefs than are those born into secular societies. For example, people with secular parents living in secular nations (lower left-hand corner of Figure 2 and Table 5) score only 16 points on religious orthodoxy, while those with equally secular parents residing in religious nations are far more orthodox, averaging 60 points (upper left corner). Similarly, respondents from devout families living in secular nations (lower right corner) score 73 on religious belief while those born to equally devout families in religious nations score 85 points (upper right corner). (3) Even in secular nations, devout families are largely successful in inculcating orthodox beliefs in their children (lower right corner). Hence, the difference between those

Table 5. Observed Mean Religiosity Score by Religiosity of Nation and Parents' Church Attendance: 15 Nations, 1991

National Religiosity	Parents' Church Attendance					Total
	Secular (1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	Devout (5)	
Religious (5)	60	67	72	81	85	81
(4)	64	68	75	80	85	78
(3)	36	46	59	69	76	62
(2)	34	46	56	64	72	55
Secular (1)	16	40	53	68	73	43
Total	32	47	59	70	79	61
Number of cases	2,495	2,926	4,059	4,065	4,770	18,315

from devout families and those from secular families is large (lower right corner versus lower left corner: 73 - 16 = 57 points). The pattern is similar in nations with intermediate levels of religiosity. (4) In religious nations, even individuals born into secular families are likely to acquire relatively orthodox beliefs (upper left corner). Hence in religious nations, the difference between those from devout and those from secular families is not so large (upper right corner versus upper left corner: 85 - 60 = 25 points).

Hypothesis 1: National Context

A clear test of our hypotheses is provided by the multivariate results which adjust for dif-

ferences among nations in modernization, the experience of Communist antireligious policies, American exceptionalism; and for differences among individuals in denomination, age, sex, and education (see Tables 4 and 6, and Figures 3 and 4).

After adjusting for all these differences, parents still strongly influence their offspring's religious beliefs. It is also clear that those living in religious societies are much more likely to acquire religious beliefs than are those living in secular societies—even if they are from equally devout families, live in nations at the same level of modernization, are the same age, sex, and denomination, and have the same level of education. In all, the religious environment of




Figure 2. Observed Religiosity Score by National Religiosity and Parents' Church Attendance




Figure 3. Predicted Religiosity Score by National Religiosity and Parents' Church Attendance: Model A

Note: For women from Protestant families, of average age and education, living in a non-Communist nation of average GNP, not the United States.

the nation matters about half as much as parents' church attendance.

Hypothesis 2: Interaction Between Nation and Family

Model A, which is portrayed in Figure 3, captures two of the most striking features of the data, but it clearly does not do full justice to the data (compare Figures 2 and 3, particularly the left-hand corners). Model B

reveals a strong, statistically significant interaction between parents' church attendance and national religiosity ($\chi^2 = 193.3$, d.f. = 4, $p < .001$). Model C, portrayed in Figure 4, has a simpler description of the interaction with an equally good fit, and so, on the grounds of parsimony, it is our preferred model (Table 6 presents the parameter estimates for Model C; Table 7 presents the resulting weight parameters).

The religiosity of the nation matters more




Figure 4. Predicted Religiosity Score by National Religiosity and Parents' Church Attendance: Model C

Note: For women from Protestant families, of average age and education, living in a non-Communist nation of average GNP, not the United States.

in some circumstances than in others (see Table 7). (1) In relatively secular nations, national context matters little or not at all ($w = .06$), while family background matters a lot ($1-w = .94$, $p < .001$). (2) In societies of intermediate devoutness, national context matters more ($w = .26$, $p < .001$), and family background matters correspondingly less ($1-w = .74$, $p < .001$). (3) And in devout societies, national context matters more ($w = .58$, $p < .001$) than family background ($1-w = .42$, $p < .001$), although family background remains important. These differences are substantively large and statistically significant, and they offer strong support for Hypotheses 2a and 2b.

The same pattern holds for both Catholics and non-Catholics, old and young, men and women, the well educated and the poorly educated, formerly communist nations and other nations, and rich nations and poorer nations (results available from the authors).⁷ OLS analyses for each nation separately show the same pattern (Appendix Table A).

Other Aspects of Nation

Modernization, as measured by the nation's GNP, slightly reduces religious orthodoxy, in conformity with modernization theory (Table 6). Compared to people living in a poor country like Poland (GNP = 21 percent of the U.S. GNP), those in a prosperous European nation like West Germany (GNP = 76

⁷ Our comparison of the effect of parents' church attendance on religious orthodoxy in secular and religious societies could be biased by ceiling effects. Religiosity is close to the maximum score in devout countries, biasing it downward, while there is little or no downward bias in secular countries. However comparisons in which ceiling effects are unlikely—say the three or four most secular rows and columns of Table 5—shows the same pattern as the whole table. For example, when comparing the most secular families with those one category up, religiosity increases from 16 to 40 (24 points) in secular nations but only from 64 to 68 (4 points) in relatively devout nations. Applying Model C to the 4 × 4 table omitting the most religious nations and the most devout parents gives a more rigorous test which produces the same pattern as was obtained for the full sample (details available on request). We conclude that ceiling effects do not appreciably bias our results.

Table 6. Nonlinear Regression Estimates Predicting Religious Belief: Model C

Parameter	Parameter Estimate
<i>Weights</i>	
w : Religiosity of nation	.06 (.03)
$1-w$: Parents' church attendance	.94** (.03)
<i>Interaction Terms for Weights</i>	
$d_{2,3}$: Intermediate religious nation (rows 2 and 3)	.20** (.03)
$d_{4,5}$: Religious nation (rows 4 and 5)	.52** (.04)
<i>Diagonal Reference Cells</i>	
a_1 : Secular parents, secular nation	37.4** (1.00)
a_2	54.8** (.63)
a_3	67.4** (.70)
a_4	81.7** (.79)
a_5 : Devout parents, religious nation	89.2** (.76)
<i>Individual Context Variables</i>	
b_1 : Age (years) ^a	.17** (.01)
b_2 : Male (1 = yes)	-7.6** (.39)
b_3 : Education (years) ^a	-1.2** (.07)
b_4 : Catholic parents (1 = yes)	-1.3** (.53)
b_5 : Non-Christian parents (1 = yes)	5.1** (1.34)
<i>National Context Variables</i>	
b_6 : Communist nation (1 = yes)	-19.7** (1.29)
b_7 : GNP per capita	-.26** (.03)
b_8 : United States (1 = yes)	18.8** (1.55)
Number of cases	17,635

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

^a Scored as deviations from their means.

** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests)

Table 7. Weight Parameters Implied by Model C

National Religiosity	National Religiosity (w)	Parental Religiosity (1 - w)
Secular	.06	.94
Intermediate	.26	.74
Devout	.58	.42

percent of the U.S. GNP) would, all else equal, hold beliefs 14 points less orthodox ($-.26 \times (76-21) = -14$). However, this effect (unlike others in the model) is not entirely robust: A plausible alternative model yields different results (available from the authors). Specifically, if the United States (which is both rich and devout) is not exceptional (contrary to the assumption of Model C), then an increase in GNP increases religious orthodoxy slightly. So no strong claim is warranted.

Communism's persistent campaign against religion seems to have shaped people's beliefs. People living in formerly Communist nations acquired religious beliefs 20 points less orthodox than otherwise similar people, a large and statistically significant difference ($p < .001$).

As many have argued, the United States seems to be exceptional. Americans hold beliefs that are, on average, 19 points more orthodox than otherwise similar people in other countries, a large and statistically significant difference ($p < .001$).

Individual Effects

Denominational differences matter slightly. People from Catholic families acquire slightly less orthodox beliefs, other things being equal (1 point out of 100, $p < .05$; Table 6).

Other individual effects are small but statistically significant and resemble those found in previous studies (Table 6). (1) Orthodox beliefs increase slightly with age. Other things equal, a 70-year-old is likely to be 9 points more orthodox than a 20-year-old. If this is a cohort effect rather than a life-cycle effect, it implies a gradual decline over time in national religiosity. (2) Men are 8 points less orthodox than women, other things being equal. (3) The well-educated are

a little less orthodox than the poorly educated: The difference in beliefs between a university graduate and someone with only a secondary school education is about 5 points, other things being equal.

CONCLUSION

The religious environment of a nation has a major impact on the beliefs of its citizens: People living in religious nations acquire, in proportion to the orthodoxy of their fellow citizens, more orthodox beliefs than those living in secular nations. This is not because they come from more devout families (although most do), nor because religious nations differ from secular nations in modernization or exposure to Communism (although they do), nor because of differences in an individual's denomination, education, age, or sex (although such differences exist). Rather, the religious character of the nation itself matters. In some circumstances, national context is more important even than family background in shaping people's beliefs. A nation's culture and the policies of its churches and government are part of the explanation. But especially important, we argue, is the pool of potential friends, teachers, work colleagues, and marriage-partners: In a religious nation this pool is mostly devout, and in a secular nation this pool is mostly secular—and these differences matter greatly. Our findings about the impact of a nation's religious environment are consistent with previous research about differences between urban and rural areas, and between secular regions and devout regions within a single nation, but such differences have not previously been systematically tested on data from many nations. Our empirical results from a powerful multivariate model using comparable data from 15 nations and over 17,000 individuals offer strong evidence for such contextual effects.⁸

⁸ The logic of our argument extends beyond religion, suggesting that national context shapes individuals' views on any attitude, value, or belief on which nations differ, and on which friends, colleagues or marriage partners influence each other. Thus, we predict that national context will influence attitudes to, among other things, politics (e.g., views on unions, government ownership of industry, welfare provision, and inequality).

Our results also clearly demonstrate that a nation's religious environment shapes the way in which religious beliefs are passed on from parent to child. In relatively secular nations, the religious views of secular families are reinforced. However, devout families in these societies are usually able to insulate their children from secular pressures. Hence in relatively secular nations, the effect of family religiosity on children's religiosity is strong, and the effect of national religious context is small. By contrast, in relatively religious societies, devout families' views are reinforced. But secular families in such societies generally do not insulate their children from religious pressures, so many acquire the beliefs of their fellow citizens. Hence, in relatively religious nations, family religiosity is less important for children's religious views than it is in secular societies.

This strong interaction between a nation's religious environment and the way in which family background influences religious belief has important consequences for future research. Studies on religious socialization (e.g., Hoge, Petrillo, and Smith 1982) usually do not take national context into account. Our results clearly show that studies that neglect the religious context of the nation can be misleading with respect to the importance of parental socialization. In devout societies like the United States, Poland, or Ireland, family religiosity effects will not be as strong. But in secular societies like much of Western Europe and most of Eastern Europe, the effect of family religiosity can be expected to be strong. If our arguments are correct, these apparent differences do not reflect differences in how families function in these societies, but instead reflect differences in the religious environments of the nations themselves.

Our results also speak to the long-running debate about U.S. religious exceptionalism (Warner 1993): They support the view that the United States is unusually religious. Both fundamentalist beliefs in a personal god (the potential "demand" for religion) and church attendance are markedly higher in the United States.

Our results do not support Stark and Iannaccone's (1994) "supply-side" analysis of differences between nations which argues that nations with religious monopolies have substantial unmet religious needs, while churches in religiously competitive nations like the United States do a better job of meeting diverse religious needs. This argument implies that those who do not attend church are more devout in monopolistic societies. But our results suggest the opposite: Those who do not attend church are actually more devout in religiously competitive societies like the United States and Northern Ireland.

Modernization theory and related arguments by many (mainly European) sociologists of religion predict that religious belief declines as nations become more modern. They contend that this has happened in many European nations in recent decades. But many other (mainly American) scholars disagree, citing the high levels of religious belief in the United States. Our results suggest that the answer to this argument turns on the issue of U.S. exceptionalism. If the United States is taken to be exceptional, as in our preferred model, our data suggest that modernization (as measured by GNP per capita) leads to a modest but statistically significant decline in religious belief in the 14 non-U.S. nations in our analysis. But if the United States is not treated as exceptional, this one case—very high in both GNP and religious belief—tips the scales in the opposite direction. In this case, modernization appears to produce a slight increase in religious belief. But the effect of modernization is not strong in either model.

Our results suggest that religious beliefs endure in large part because the religious environment of a nation shapes the beliefs of its citizens. Most residents of European nations in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—and the European immigrants who populated the New World—believed in a supernatural, at least vaguely anthropomorphic God who was personally concerned with individual humans. They agreed on these fundamental points, while often differing on denominational loyalty and specific points of doctrine. Devout parents raised mostly devout children, helped by the prevailing religious atmosphere of the nation. Crucially, even when parental socialization failed, the

ity), social issues (e.g., feminism, divorce, sexuality, or abortion), and social groups (e.g., prejudice against racial or ethnic groups).

religious atmosphere of the nation and the devout beliefs of the overwhelming majority of potential friends, teachers, colleagues, and marriage partners inculcated belief.

Not until external forces like modernization, the Enlightenment, the growth of education, or the rise of science bring the average levels of belief in the nation down appreciably do things begin to change. Our results suggest that religiosity then changes rapidly—not declining slowly and gradually but dropping precipitously. The offspring of devout families mostly remain devout, but the offspring of more secular families now strongly tend to be secular. A self-reinforcing spiral of secularization then sets in, shifting the nation's average religiosity ever further away from orthodoxy. So after generations of stability, religious belief declines abruptly in the course of a few generations to the modest levels seen in many Western European nations today.

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Appendix Table A. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Models Predicting Respondent's Religiosity: 15 Nations, 1991

Nation	Standardized Coefficient	Metric Coefficient ^a						R ²	Number of Cases
		Parents' Church Attendance	Parents' Church Attendance	Age	Male	Educa- tion	Catholic		
<i>Total</i>									
Standardized	.49	—	.09	-.13	-.04	-.03	—	.27	19,712
Metric	—	11	.18	-8	-5	-2	27	—	—
East Germany	.53	13	.19	-8	0 ‡	-1 ‡	0 ‡	.35	1,485
Slovenia	.52	13	-.15	-7	-3	-2 ‡	7	.36	2,042
Netherlands	.58	13	.22	-1 ‡	-1	-12	16	.33	1,633
Hungary	.45	11	.39	-10	-2	1 ‡	18	.39	985
Norway	.40	13	.33	-12	-1	18 ‡	30	.29	1,497
Great Britain	.31	7	.28	-10	-2	4	41	.21	1,244
West Germany	.50	12	.08	-7	0 ‡	-5	25	.25	1,346
New Zealand	.30	7	.21	-10	-1	8	44	.17	1,067
Australia	.32	7	.12	-9	-1	7	43	.16	2,200
Austria	.39	9	.13	-8	0 ‡	-3	37	.18	980
Italy	.28	6	.09	-9	-1	23	32	.18	983

(Appendix Table A continued on next page)

(Appendix Table A continued from previous page)

Nation	Standardized Coefficient		Metric Coefficient ^a					R ²	Number of Cases
	Parents' Church Attendance	Parents' Church Attendance	Age	Male	Educa- tion	Catholic	Constant		
Poland	.33	8	-.01 ‡	-5	-1	19	29	.21	1,062
Ireland	.16	5	.22	-7	-1	4	57	.14	1,005
United States	.28	5	.09	-8	-1	-3	70	.16	1,350
Northern Ireland	.25	4	.23	-7	-1	2 ‡	67	.17	833

Note: Nations are listed in order of respondent's religiosity, from most secular (East Germany) to most religious (Northern Ireland).

In a pooled analysis controlling for characteristics of nations, parents' church attendance has a standardized effect of .40, and the effect for religiosity of the nation is .24; the effect for Communist nation = -.11, GNP = .06, age = .09, male = -.12, education = -.08, Catholic = -.04, with R² = .35. Including a multiplicative interaction between religiosity of nation and parents' church attendance as in Model C gives b = -1.48 ($t = -11.6$, $p < .001$).

^a Except for row 1, which presents standardized coefficients.

‡ Estimate not significant at $p < .05$ (two-tailed tests). All other estimates are significant.

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